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Community Reinvestment Act and Its Impact on Bank Mergers
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Congress passed the Community Reinvest-
ment Act (CRA or Act)' after neighborhood activists presented
evidence that banks were withdrawing credit from minority neigh-
borhoods while continuing to take deposits from them.2 This banking
practice directly contributed to the neighborhoods' deterioration.
Community activists believed banks were engaging in "redlining,"
drawing red lines around certain inner-city, minority-populated ar-
eas, and refusing to make loans within those areas. Tom Fox,
director of San Diego based Normal Heights Community Develop-
ment Corporation and one of the authors of the Act, stated that
during his research in Chicago, a bank loan officer pulled a map out
of a drawer and said he was not allowed to make loans in a neighbor-
hood that had been clearly outlined in red.4
The initial impact of the Community Reinvestment Act on the
regulation of financial institutions was not dramatic. For many years
after its adoption in 1977, the CRA was little more than a vague
statement of principle without much real-world effect.5 In 1989, how-
ever, Congress greatly enhanced the CRA's impact as part of
comprehensive banking legislation reform.6 Currently, the role of the
Act is expanding, and CRA-based challenges to bank mergers and
other transactions subject to CRA scrutiny are now routine, even
when the institution in question has received high marks for CRA
compliance in recent examinations.7 Some mergers and acquisitions
1. Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, § 801, 91
Stat. 1111, 1147-48 (1977) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1994)).
2. See Alden Clark, CRA: No Redlining, BUS. J. CHAR., Dec. 21, 1987, at v2, n37.
3. See id.
4. See iL
5. See Paul H. Schieber, A CRA Guide for Foreign Banks, AM. BANKER, Feb. 14,
1992, at 6 (discussing, among other things, the actual effect of the CRA on banks).
6. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73, § 1212, 103 Stat. 183, 526-28 (1989) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2902,2906 (1994)).
7. See John R. Wilke, Home Loans to Blacks, Hispanics, Soared in '94, WALL ST. J.,
July 19, 1995, at Al. The majority of the complaints were initiated by community activist
organizations. These organizations expressed concern that the transactions would reduce,
or even eliminate, needed services to minorities and to individuals of low- and moderate-
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are actually derailed by the statute; however, even if the deals are not
entirely defeated, the costs of consummating a transaction in the face
of a CRA challenge can be substantial!
As a result of its increasing impact on mergers and acquisitions,
the CRA is now controversial. Many bankers, who want the scope of
the CRA limited, argue that the statute imposes burdensome re-
quirements and unfairly disadvantages depository institutions as
compared to their nonbank competitors.9 Community activists, who
want to expand the Act's scope, contend that the CRA only begins to
address problems of access to credit in low-income communities."0
As traditional geographic and service restrictions on banking institu-
tions continue to erode," and as bank merger activity continues to
increase, the Act's expanding impact on bank mergers may favor ac-
tivists' interests. Consequently, in an attempt to shift the balance
again, bankers have become more vocal in expressing their view that
the CRA unfairly burdens their ability to create larger geographic
income. They also argued that none of the banks against whom complaints were initiated
were doing an adequate job of serving their communities under the CRA requirements.
See Laura T. Beyer, Comment, The Community Reinvestment Act: Boost to Low- and
Moderate-Income Communities; Set-back for Minority-owned Banks, 1 N.C. BANKING
INST. 387, 394-95 (1997) (stating that only between one and two percent of applications
filed with the Federal Reserve Board have been protested by community activist groups
on CRA grounds since 1988).
8. See Ellen Braitman, Fed Is Asked to Reconsider Blocking of Merger, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 25, 1991, at 5 (discussing First Interstate Bancsystem's requested recon-
sideration of the Federal Reserve Board's decision to turn down the bank's merger
application).
9. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act:
An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291,312 (1993) (stating that the Act applies "only
to depository institutions-banks and savings associations-and not to other types of
lenders" and that "it discriminates within the category of depository institutions by plac-
ing greater disproportionate burdens on some institutions and thus giving an artificial
competitive advantage to others").
10. See Activists Think Mergers Will Aid Cause, RECORD (Northern New Jersey),
Sept. 15, 1995, at 4 (contending that banks ignore low-income neighborhoods in violation
of the CRA).
11. In 1933, the McFadden Act amended the National Bank Act to permit national
banks to establish and acquire branches within the state in which they were located to the
same extent the state-chartered banks were permitted to establish and acquire branches.
See McFadden Act, ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189-90 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36
(1994)). The Douglas Amendment, section 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act, re-
stricts acquisitions outside of the state where the acquirer's principal operations are
conducted, except in such instances where the acquisition is specifically authorized by the
laws of the state in which the acquired branch was located. 70 Stat. 133, 135 (1956)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)). A review of state banking laws published in 1989 indi-
cated that most states have adopted some form of legislation permitting to some extent
interstate acquisitions, with only three states continuing to prohibit interstate acquisitions
entirely. Deborah A. DeMott, Mergers and Acquisitions of Banks and Bank Holding
Companies, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, 823,829-831 (F. Puleo ed. 1990).
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markets.
In light of this controversy, this Comment examines community
reinvestment as a factor in the review of bank merger and acquisition
requests. In doing so, this Comment (1) introduces the legislative
history leading to the CRA, 2 (2) discusses the application of antitrust
standards to banks,'13 (3) examines the evolution of "Community Re-
investment" in relation to antitrust standards, 4 and (4) identifies
several shortcomings of the Act.5 Ultimately, this Comment con-
cludes that although the CRA has had only a mild impact on mergers
and acquisitions in the past, the Act will become one of the most sig-
nificant (if not controlling) factors in getting such deals approved in
the future. 6
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The debate preceding enactment of the CRA was similar to the
current debate surrounding the Act. Community groups urged pas-
sage of the Act to curb what they believed to be a lack of adequate
lending in low and moderate income areas. 7  On the other hand,
bank and thrift officials generally opposed the CRA as an unneces-
sary measure that could, among other things, unduly affect business
decisions by mandating credit allocation and cause safety and sound-
ness problems by forcing institutions to make excessively risky
loans. However, legislators, activists, and bankers agreed that un-
less the practice of "redlining" low- and moderate-income
communities ended, those communities could continue to deteriorate
from a lack of financial resources.
Although concern about redlining was a prominent theme in the
legislative history to the CRA, Congress did not perceive the pro-
posed legislation as a means of directly prohibiting discrimination in
lending.9 Indeed, a leading community activist objected to the bill
preceding the CRA specifically because the bill did not expressly
12. See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 23-50 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 51-113 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
17. For further discussion, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
18. See generally GEN. AccT. OFF., COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:
CHALLENGES REMAIN TO SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT CRA (1995) (discussing some of
the criticisms to the CRA offered by banks).
19. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 17,604 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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"prohibit discrimination" in lending practices.' Despite activists'
suggestions that Congress act firmly to prohibit such discrimination,
Congress chose not to punish discrimination in lending in the CRA.
Further, Congress did not envision the CRA as requiring affirmative
action in lending on the basis of race, sex, ethnic background, or
other categories. Additionally, Congress did not intend the CRA to
induce depository institutions to support local charities or otherwise
subsidize worthy causes. Instead, the overwhelming focus of the leg-
islative history of the CRA was on the need to preserve local
communities through a recognition of the fact that depository institu-
tions could invest in their local communities and still make a profit."
Consequently, the CRA was phrased broadly to encompass deposi-
tory institutions throughout the country, including institutions in
suburban, rural, and wealthy urban areas as well as institutions serv-
ing decaying inner-city neighborhoods.
Ultimately, as the title of the statute indicates, the Act (and the
legislative debates preceding the Act) focused on "communities" and
reinvestment in those communities. The CRA responded to a con-
cern about depository institutions transferring funds outside the
communities in which the funds were obtained, regardless of whether
those communities were rural, urban, or suburban. In other words,
CRA emphasized communities, not race, ethnicity, gender, or other
categories that dominate public policy debates in the 1990s.'
III. BANK MERGERS BEFORE THE CRA: ANTITRUST STANDARDS
Before the enactment of the CRA, approval of bank mergers
was conditioned on satisfactory compliance with antitrust standards.
Bank mergers, as a general matter, are subject to the same antitrust
standards as mergers in other industries. However, when considered
more closely, the antitrust analysis for bank mergers contains impor-
tant differences from that analysis in other contexts. The
development of the concept of "convenience and needs" in bank
merger analysis accounts for most of these differences. This section
of this Comment will explain the original view of federal regulations
of bank mergers, explore the evolution of the original view of anti-
trust scrutiny of bank mergers, and discuss the implications of the
20. See Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S. 406 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 133 (1977).
21. See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 17,631 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire); id. at
17,633 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
22. Legislators both for and against the proposed statute agreed that the bill was
aimed at bolstering decaying communities. See id. at 17,628 (statement of Sen. Morgan).
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modem antitrust analysis of bank mergers and the relationship of this
analysis to the CRA.
Bank merger activity was first regulated in 1956 when Congress
enacted the Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA).' Congress in-
tended the BHCA to prevent undue concentration of banking
resources and to limit the geographic expansion of bank holding
companies. Because the BHCA reached only mergers involving bank
holding companies,24 Congress passed the Bank Merger Acte in 1960.
The Bank Merger Act expanded the scope of federal regulation of
mergers to the entire banking industry. Because two pieces of spe-
cific legislation governed bank mergers, commentators thought that
bank mergers were immune from scrutiny under the general antitrust
standards of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 189026 and sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act.27 This immunity, however, proved to be a
fiction.
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank," the Supreme
Court held that bank mergers were within the reach of section 7 of
the Clayton Act.29 In Philadelphia National Bank, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) approved the merger of two
large Philadelphia banks?. The OCC granted this approval despite
23. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994)).
24. The BHCA specifically sets forth unlawful actions:
[the BHCA makes it] unlawful, except with the prior approval of the [Federal
Reserve] Board, (1) for any action to be taken that causes any company to be-
come a bank holding company; (2) for any action to be taken that causes a bank
to become a subsidiary of a bank holding company; (3) for any bank holding
company to acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares
of any bank if, after such acquisition, such company will directly or indirectly
own or control more than 5 per centum of the voting shares of such bank; (4) for
any bank holding company or subsidiary thereof, other than a bank, to acquire
all or substantially all of the assets of a bank; or (5) for any bank holding com-
pany to merge or consolidate with any other bank holding company.
12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1994).
25. Financial Deposit Insurance Act, Pub. L. No. 86-463,74 Stat. 129 (1960) (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1994)) (amending the BHCA and expanding the
scope of federal regulation of banking mergers).
26. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)). Section 1 of the Act prohibits contracts, combinations in the form
of trust, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. See id.
27. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1994)). Section 7 of the Act prohibits monopolies that cause an unlawful
restraint on trade and commerce. Id.
28. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
29. See id. at 354.
30. See id. at 333
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the fact that the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Department of Justice found
that the "proposed merger would have substantial anticompetitive
effects."3 In response to the banks' argument that the merger would
stimulate economic development in the Philadelphia area, the Court
held that a merger likely to lessen competition cannot be "saved be-
cause ... [of] some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits
and credits."32 The Court stated that Congress' "value choice" to
proscribe anticompetitive mergers reached benign and malignant
mergers alike.3
In 1966, in response to Philadelphia National Bank, Congress
passed amendments to the 1956 BHCA and to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act.' The 1966 amendments, like Philadelphia National
Bank, recognized the right of the Department of Justice to challenge
bank mergers on anticompetitive grounds.35 On the other hand, un-
like the holding of Philadelphia National Bank, the amendments
provided that otherwise prohibited anticompetitive mergers could be
lawful if their adverse competitive effects were clearly outweighed by
their beneficial effects in meeting the "convenience and needs of the
community.",
Portions of the principal statutory provisions that govern bank
mergers and acquisitions rely on the general statutory language of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. However, these statutory provisions
are fundamentally distinct from general antitrust laws because they
31. Id. at 332-33.
32. I& at 371.
33. See id.
34. See Bank Merger Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (1966) (amending the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act and the BHCA).
35. See id.
36. The 1966 amendments to subsection (c) of section 3 of the BHCA revised the
BHCA to provide that the Federal Reserve Board shall not approve
any other proposed acquisition or merger or consolidation ... whose effect in
any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of
trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction
are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the trans-
action in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
Pub. L. No. 89-485,§ 7,80 Stat. 236,237-38 (1966).
37. See Change in Bank Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 18170)(7) (1994); Bank Merger
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1825(c)(5) (1994); Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)
(1994).
38. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j)(7)(A)-(B), 1828(c)(5)(A)-(B), 1842(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1994)
(setting out general standards of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act).
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include "the convenience and needs of the community" defense.39
While it is well established that bank regulators are required to apply
general antitrust standards in evaluating the anticompetitive effects
of proposed mergers, the analysis of competition is only part of the
relevant inquiry.
In bank mergers and acquisitions, the responsible regulator must
engage in a three-part evaluation. 4° The responsible regulator must
engage in a competitive analysis,4 a safety and soundness evalua-
tion,42 and a convenience and needs inquiry.43 After the regulator
delineates the relevant geographic and product markets,4 the initial
39. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 18170)(7)(B).
40. Determining which statutes control a merger or an acquisition and which regula-
tory agency reviews the transaction depends on the nature of the transaction and the
charter of the acquiring or surviving bank and whether a bank holding company is a party
to the proposed transaction. If the BHCA governs the transaction, approval by the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board will be necessary. See 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a). If
the transaction is governed by the Change in Bank Control Act, then approval must be
obtained from the "appropriate Federal banking agency." 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q) (1994).
The "appropriate agency" is (1) the Comptroller of the Currency in the case of a national
banking association; (2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the
case of a state-chartered bank that is a Federal Reserve member bank; (3) the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation in the case of a state-chartered insured bank that is not a
member of the Federal Reserve; and (4) the Office of Thrift Supervision in the case of a
savings association or a savings and loan holding company. See id. If the transaction is
governed by the Bank Merger Act, the "responsible agency" from whom approval must
be given is (1) the Comptroller of the Currency if "the acquiring, assuming, or resulting
bank is to be a national bank;" (2) the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
if "the acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be a State member bank;" (3) the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation if the "acquiring, assuming, or resulting bank is to be
a State nonmember insured bank;" and (4) the Office of Thrift Supervision if the
"acquiring, assuming, or resulting institution is to be a savings association." 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c)(2).
41. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j)(7)(A)-(B), 1828(c)(5)(A)-(B), 1842(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1994)
(setting out general standards of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act).
42. See 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(7)(C)-(F) (1994) (stating that the appropriate agency may
disapprove any proposed acquisition if the financial condition of the acquiring bank might
"jeopardize the financial stability of the bank or result in an adverse effect on the bank or
savings association insurance fund"); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5) (1994) (stating that the
"responsible agency shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources
and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions"); 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2)
(1994) (stating that the Federal Reserve Board shall take into consideration the financial
and managerial resources and future prospects of the companies and banks concerned).
43. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j)(7)(B), 1828(c)(5), 1842(c)(2) (1994) (stating that the
appropriate regulator shall consider the convenience and needs of the community to be
served).
44. The relevant geographic and product markets in which the merger will have a
direct and immediate effect must be established to determine the probable competitive
effects of a contemplated merger. "Product markets" derives from the phrase "line of
commerce" in section 7 of the Clayton Act; "geographic markets" derives from the lan-
guage "section of the country." See H. HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL
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competitive analysis evaluation requires the regulator to decide
whether the proposed transaction will create a monopoly, further a
combination or conspiracy to monopolize, or substantially lessen
competition.45 The second analysis, the safety and soundness evalua-
tion, requires an assessment of the financial and managerial resources
of the parties to the proposed transaction." This analysis considers a
number of factors, including the sources of capital for the transaction,
the capitalization of the institutions involved, the competence and
experience of management personnel, and the future prospects of the
proposed and existing institutions. If the proposed merger is not pre-
cluded due to safety and soundness concerns, but is deemed to have
significant anticompetitive effects, the regulator must then evaluate a
third factor.47 The third analysis balances the potential of the merger
to enhance the "convenience and needs" of bank customers in the
local community against the potentially anticompetitive effects of the
transaction. 8 This convenience and needs inquiry requires the reck-
oning of social and economic debits and credits that was rejected in
Philadelphia National Bank.49
Although antitrust standards are only one factor regulators ana-
lyze as they consider whether a proposed merger should be approved,
the modern emphasis on the needs of local communities in this analy-
sis parallels the interests of the CRA. Under the antitrust analysis,
the responsible regulator must be satisfied that, after conducting a
three-part test," the benefits of meeting the "convenience and needs"
of bank customers in the community outweigh the adverse competi-
tive effect. Ultimately, this recognition of the importance of
satisfying the banking needs of local communities was well en-
trenched in antitrust law prior to the enactment of the CRA.
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF "COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT"
In the late 1960s, banks seeking approval for mergers began to
consider their ability to serve the "convenience and needs" of the
ANTrrRUST LAW, § 3.3, at 62, § 3.5, at 70 (1985).
45. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j)(7)(A)-(B), 1828(c)(5)(A)-(B), 1842(c)(1)(A)-(B) (1994)
(setting out general standards of the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act).
46. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j)(7)(C)-(F), 1828(c)(5), 1842(c)(2) (1994). For further
discussion, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
47. See id.
48. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(j)(7)(B), 1828(c)(5), 1842(c)(2) (1994) (stating that the
appropriate regulator shall consider the convenience and needs of the community to be
served).
49. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 323 (1963).
50. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
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community in which they were chartered. Banks considered this fac-
tor because they could defend charges that their proposed merger
violated antitrust laws by demonstrating that the merger enhanced
their ability to effectively serve their communities. In the 1970s,
Congress heightened the need for banks to focus on the "convenience
and needs" of local communities when it passed the CRA. The CRA
elevated the "convenience and needs" inquiry to an affirmative duty
required for bank merger approval, rather than a defense to an alle-
gation that the merger violated antitrust laws. As such, community
needs and the CRA increasingly impact bank merger activity. Before
one can recognize the growing impact of the CRA on bank mergers,
one should understand the evolution of the Act over the last two
decades. The history of the Act may be understood in three phases:
(1) the original passage of the Act, (2) the amendments to the Act,
and (3) the Act's evolving impact on bank mergers.
The Community Reinvestment Act was passed as Title VIII of
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977.51 The CRA
requires each federal banking regulator to encourage banks to meet
the credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered,
consistent with the institution's safe and sound operation." Conse-
quently, regulators must assess an institution's record of lending in its
community and take that record into account when evaluating an ap-
plication by an institution for a merger or acquisition. 3
Since the passage of the CRA, the regulatory, economic, and
legislative environments, relative to the banking community, have
changed. The CRA has been no exception. The Act has evolved sig-
nificantly over the last two decades. Table 1 briefly illustrates the
major amendments to the CRA since its passage.
In 1977, the CRA was enacted in response to a national concern
over bank redlining' practices, and it highlighted Congress' concern
that banking activity must recognize the "convenience and needs" of
local communities. Although the Act uses the terms "convenience
and needs," like the bank antitrust statutes, the Act creates an af-
firmative credit obligation rather than a potential defense to CRA
violations. This affirmative duty is not enforced through direct civil
51. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
52. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1994).
53. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1994).
54. Black's Law Dictionary defines "redlining" as a "pattern of discrimination in
which financial institutions refuse to make mortgage loans, regardless of credit record of
the applicant, on properties in specified areas because of alleged deteriorating condi-
tions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1279 (6th ed. 1990).
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55. GEN. Acer. OFF., COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT: CHALLENGES REMAIN
TO SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENT CRA (1995).
56. Attempts prior to the Community Reinvestment Act to control redlining prac-
tices included the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994) (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin in the financing of
homes) and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-11 (1994) (requiring
the collection and disclosure of lending records).
57. Financial regulatory agencies are required to take community reinvestment rec-
ords into consideration in evaluating institutions' applications for deposit facilities. See 12
U.S.C. § 2903 (1994). An application for a "deposit facility" for purposes of the CRA
1997]
Year Amendments
1977 Passed as Title VII of the Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act of 1977.
1989 Amended by the Financial Institution Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to require that
CRA examination rating and a written evaluation of each
assessment factor be made publicly available and to estab-
lish a four-part qualitative rating scale.
1991 Amended by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) to require public dis-
cussion of data underlying the regulator's assessment of an
institution's CRA performance in the public portion of the
CRA evaluation.
1992 Amended by the Housing and Community Development
Act of 1992 to provide that the regulators consider activi-
ties and investments involving minority and women owned
financial institutions and low-income credit unions in as-
sessing the CRA performance records of institutions
cooperating with such institutions to meet local community
credit needs.
1994 Amended by the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 to require that institu-
tions with interstate branching structures receive a
separate rating and written evaluation for each state in
which they operate and a separate written evaluation of
their performance within a multistate metropolitan area
where they have branches in two or more states within the
area.
or criminal penalties like other redlining statutes. 6 Instead, the CRA
employs primarily indirect sanctions, including delays in or even de-
nials of acquisition, merger, or branching requests.'
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While the CRA has been criticized for its lack of effective en-
forcement mechanisms, the Act does empower each of the financial
regulatory agencies to promulgate regulations58 implementing Con-
gress' mandate that "regulated financial institutions ... serve the
convenience and needs of the communities in which they are char-
tered to do business."59 Under this grant of authority, the financial
regulatory agencies adopted regulations requiring banks to adopt and
review the CRA policy statements " and to maintain a record of pub-
lic comments on the bank's performance in meeting local credit
needs." The CRA also requires regulators to assess an institution's
CRA performance under twelve "assessment factors," which focus
upon the bank's community involvement.62 On the basis of these as-
sessment factors, regulators assign a CRA rating of "outstanding,"
"satisfactory," "needs to improve," or "substantial noncompliance."6 3
Amendments to the CRA contained in the Financial Institution
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) re-
quire that the results of a CRA examination appear in "a written
evaluation of the institution's record of meeting the credit needs of
its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighbor-
includes requests for (1) charters; (2) deposit insurance; (3) branching approvals; (4) of-
fice relocations; and (5) mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 2902(3) (1994).
58. See 12 U.S.C. § 2905 (1994). Regulations by the various financial supervisory
agencies implementing the CRA are found in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 12
C.F.R. § 25 (1996) (regulations by the Comptroller of the Currency); 12 C.F.R. § 228
(1995) (regulations by the Federal Reserve System); 12 C.F.R. § 345 (1996) (regulations
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation); 12 C.F.R. § 563e (1996) (regulations by
the Office of Thrift Supervision).
59. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1) (1994).
60. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.4,228.4,345.4, 563e.4 (1994).
61. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.5,228.5,345.5, 563e.5 (1994).
62. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.7, 228.7, 345.7, 563e.7 (1994). The assessment factors in-
cluded: (1) the activities of the bank to ascertain credit needs of its community; (2) the
bank's marketing practices; (3) the participation of the board of directors in formulating
and reviewing CRA policies; (4) practices by the bank that discourage particular types of
credit applications; (5) the bank's geographic distribution of credit; (6) evidence that the
bank has engaged in illegal practices; (7) the opening and closing of bank offices; (8) in-
volvement of the bank in development and redevelopment projects; (9) home mortgage,
small business, and small farm loans by the bank; (10) the bank's participation in govern-
ment-issued loan programs; (11) the bank's resources in meeting community credit needs;
and (12) other factors which reasonably bear on the extent to which a bank is meeting
credit needs. See id.
63. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2) (1994).
64. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1212(b), 103 Stat. 183, 527-28 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 2906 (1994)) (amending the Community Reinvestment Act to require, beginning July 1,
1990, disclosure of the public section of an examining agency's CRA evaluation of an
institution).
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hoods."6' The written evaluation must contain both a public and a
confidential section.' The public section must be made available to
the public for any CRA examination conducted on or after July 1,
1990.67
Despite the original purpose of the Act to encourage banks to
meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they are
chartered, and despite the original amendments intended to provide
an enforcement mechanism for the Act, few branching or merger re-
quests have been denied on CRA groundsf. This is unlikely to
continue.69 In 1995, Congress issued sweeping new changes to the
CRA,0 and future regulations are on the horizon. These amend-
ments serve to increase the effectiveness of the CRA.
In 1995, concerns about the effectiveness of the CRA and its
regulatory burden on institutions led both the Clinton administration
and Congress to seek new methods to make the CRA more effective
and less burdensome. 7' The stated goals of the regulators' reform ini-
tiative, announced by President Clinton in July 1993, were to (1) base
CRA examinations more on results than paperwork, (2) clarify per-
formance standards, (3) make examinations more consistent, (4)
improve enforcement to provide more effective sanctions, and (5)
reduce the costs and burdens of compliance.2 Subsequently, regula-
tors issued two notices of proposed rule making.?3 The first notice
was issued by the FRB, OCC, Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS),
and FDIC on December 21, 1993. 74 The proposal would have re-
placed the current qualitative CRA examination system, including
the twelve assessment factors, with a more quantitative system based
on actual performance as measured through the use of three tests:
65. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)(1) (1994).
66. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)(2) (1994).
67. See 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b) (1994).
68. See Beyer, supra note 7, at 394-95 (stating that only between one and two percent
of applications filed with the Fed have been protested by community activist groups on
CRA grounds since 1988).
69. See id at 399-400 (discussing the recent trend of the Federal Reserve Board to
approve large bank mergers, but stating that over 50 percent of the merger transactions
approved by federal regulators during the fourth quarter of 1996 were contested and that
a large number of the protests were filed under the Act).
70. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 25,228, 563e, 203,345).
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See supra note 18.
74. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466, 67,467
(1993) (proposed Dec. 21, 1993).
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the lending, service, and investment tests.75 Regulators released the
second proposal via publication in the Federal Register on October 7,
1994.76 This proposal revised the original proposal and increased the
role of examiner discretion in CRA examinations. After receiving
extensive public comments, regulators promulgated the revised CRA
regulation in May 1995.'
The new CRA regulation, like past regulations, applies to all in-
sured banks and thrifts engaged in lending to the public. It adopted
the three part, performance-based, evaluation system for institutions
that do not qualify as small institutions.' The regulation defines
small institutions as independent retail institutions with total assets of
less than $250 million and holding company affiliates with total assets
of less than $1 billion. The revised regulation includes a streamlined
examination for small banks and the option for all institutions to
have their CRA performance examined according to a regulator-
approved strategic plan.
Recognizing the diversity in communities' characteristics and
needs, the revised CRA regulation makes explicit the "performance
context" against which the tests and standards set out in the proposed
regulation are to be applied. This "performance context" includes
consideration of six factors concerning the unique characteristics of
the institution under examination and the market in which it oper-
ates.79
The data collection provisions of the new regulation became ef-
fective on January 1, 1996. The new CRA standards themselves,
however, will not become effective until July 1, 1997. Small institu-
75. See id.
76. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 59 Fed. Reg. 51,232, 51,234
(1994) (proposed Oct. 7, 1994) (discussing comments on the market share component and
reasons for modifying the Lending Test).
77. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156.
78. Specifically, (1) the lending test is designed to measure a retail institution's per-
formance in meeting the credit needs of its assessment area, as measured by originations
and purchases of home mortgages, small business and small farm loans, and community
development loans; (2) the investment test considers the institution's record of helping to
meet the credit needs of its assessment area (the test includes only investments that bene-
fit the institution's assessment area or areas, or benefit a larger region that includes those
areas) through qualified investments; and (3) the service test evaluates an institution's
record of helping to meet the credit needs of its assessment area or areas by evaluating:
(i) the availability and effectiveness of the institution's retail delivery systems; and (ii) the
extent and innovation quality of its community development services. See Community
Reinvestment and Home Mortgage Disclosure (FRB Regulations BB and C), COM-
PLIANCE ALERT, June 12, 1995 [hereinafter Home Mortgage Disclosure]. For further
discussion, see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 18.
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tions automatically came under the small-institution rules as of Janu-
ary 1, 1996, unless they chose to comply with the lending, investment,
and service tests. Institutions must submit strategic plans by April 1,
1997, in order to be qualified by the time the rule goes into full ef-
fect.,,
Because the new CRA revisions emphasize performance, not
process, banks will be able to focus more on lending and less on pa-
perwork.81 Arguably, this should push banks even further into low- to
moderate-income communities."
As the 1995 amendments become fully effective this year, law-
makers are continuing to work on additional changes to the CRA for
the future. Unlike current revisions to the CRA, which strengthen
the enforcement provisions and make CRA compliance a more sig-
nificant consideration for banks seeking mergers, proposed changes
to the Act appear to focus more on streamlining the application
process for mergers and acquisitions. The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System has proposed a comprehensive amendment
to the BHCA and Change in Bank Control Act, known as Regulation
Y. 3 The proposed amendment is intended to improve the competi-
tiveness of bank holding companies by eliminating unnecessary
regulatory burdens and operating restrictions and by streamlining the
application/notice process." The Board also proposed to establish a
streamlined and expedited review process for bank and nonbanking
proposals by well-run bank holding companies.
Two important principles underlie these proposed revisions.
First, the new regulation would establish objective and verifiable
measures for each of the criteria set forth in the BHCA. In addi-
tion, these new regulations would provide an expedited and nearly
red-tape-free merger approval process for those bank holding com-
panies that meet stated measures. Second, the application/notice
80. See Home Mortgage Disclosure, supra note 78.
81. See Beyer, supra note 7, at 394.
82. See id at 397-98.
83. Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control (Regulation Y); Proposed
Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,242 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225).
84. See id. The proposal would permit a well-rated and well-run BHC to acquire
banks and nonbanking companies and to engage in permissible nonbanking activities de
novo with the filing of a simple short letter and only 15 days advance notice. All bank
acquisition proposals that exceed 35 percent of assets (or cause a small BHC to exceed
$300 million in assets) or that involve bank holding companies that otherwise do not meet
the qualifying criteria would be reviewed under the FRB's current 30/60-day procedure.
See id. at 47,243.
85. See id.
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process, according to the proposed revisions, would focus on an
analysis of the effects of the specific merger proposal and should not
normally become a vehicle for comprehensively evaluating and ad-
dressing CRA supervisory and compliance issues.'
This amendment to the BHCA has met with heavy resistance
from community activists groups. These groups believe that the fif-
teen-day streamlined notice period would not allow adequate time
for concerned organizations to file formal comments opposing a
merger or acquisitionY Community activist groups view the proposal
as a way of limiting the effectiveness of the CRA. However, banks
seeking approval for mergers or acquisitions view the proposed
regulation as an efficient method for consummating the transaction.
As a result of the revised CRA, which effectively reduces
"paperwork compliance" with the Act and places more emphasis on
performance, and the proposed Regulation Y, which expedites the
approval process for bank mergers and acquisitions, banking custom-
ers in low- and moderate-income communities should see a
resurgence of banking activity in their areas. This resurgence will be
a consequence of the reduced cost of compliance with the CRA and
the increased enforcement provided by the revised Act.
As a result of amendments enhancing enforcement, and of pro-
posed amendments streamlining banks' ability to assure compliance
with CRA, the CRA's impact on the banking industry should grow
rapidly.' In recent years, several branching, merger, and conversion
requests have been delayed on CRA grounds. 9 The increased focus
of regulators on the CRA, evidenced by the 1989 joint CRA state-
ment, the FIRREA amendments to the CRA, and the success
community groups have experienced in challenging merger and ac-
quisition applications on CRA grounds all indicate that this trend will
continue. 9°
86. See id.
87. The new procedure provides, however, that the Federal Reserve System's
(System) action is subject to revocation if the primary supervisor (FRB, FDIC, OCC, or
OTS) objects to a transaction within the relevant notice period. Because bank acquisition
proposals may not be consummated for 15 days after System's action, which is the post-
approval waiting period established by statute to allow the Department of Justice to re-
view a transaction, it is expected that the notice period for the primary supervisor will
expire prior to consummation of a bank acquisition proposal. See id.
88. See id.
89. See Mitsui Bank Withdraws Application for Conversion of Nonbank Trust Unit, 57
Banking Rep. (BNA), at 169, 173 (1991) (stating that Tokyo's Mitsui Taiyo Kobe Bank
withdrew its request to convert Taiyo Kobe Bank and Trust Co. in New York City to a
commercial bank, arguably out of concern for denial of the request on CRA grounds).
90. See CRA Hurdles Get Higher, BANK EXPANSION REPORTER, Sept. 19, 1988, at 4-
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Compliance with the CRA is gradually shifting from being a
relevant factor in the assessment of a proposed transaction's non-
competitive effects toward being a controlling factor. The substantial
attention regulators give to an acquiring institution's CRA record
reflects a regulatory belief that "financial institutions that make
meeting their responsibilities under the CRA an integral part of their
management and operational structure are best able to accomplish
the goals of the statute which includes meeting the credit needs of
their entire communities, including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods, consistent with safe and sound operations."'"
Most CRA-related challenges do not result in the denial of a
merger application.92 Instead, the acquiring institution and the pro-
testing community group, or responsible regulatory agency, usually
reach a settlement.93 Though the forms of settlements may vary sub-
stantially, institutions are usually required to make substantial CRA
commitments.' In effect, these "CRA commitments" are typically
loan commitments for a specific dollar amount.95 The CRA commit-
ments generally win regulator approval for a transaction;96 however,
that is not always the case.
For example, the FRB denied Continental Illinois Bancorp's ap-
plication to acquire an Arizona bank, despite Continental's proposal
to remedy its CRA deficiencies via loan commitments. Continental
applied to the Fed under section 3 of the BHCA to acquire all the
voting shares of Grand Canyon State Bank, a small state-chartered
commercial bank. The competitive effects of the merger were not at
issue. The Fed's analysis instead focused on the needs of the com-
munity to be served by Continental's present and proposed bank
subsidiaries. The order issued by the Fed stated that while CRA im-
provement commitments are often sufficient to secure approval,
6 (summarizing Federal Reserve Board decisions addressing CRA issues).
91. See Crestar Financial Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 382 (1989); see also Core States
Financial Corp., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 176, 178-79 (1990).
92. See Beyer, supra note 7, at 400.
93. See Ellen Braitman & Yvette Kantrow, NCNB and C&S Make $10 Billion CRA
Pledge, AM. BANKER, Aug. 7, 1991, at 1 (discussing two major bank holding companies'
agreements to extend ten billion dollars in "community development" loans over a ten
year period after political activists announced their intention to file CRA challenges to
their proposed combination).
94. See id.
95. See icL
96. See FED Rules Illinois Thrift May Form Bank Holding Company Despite CRA
Violations, 47 Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA), Oct. 27, 1986, at 699.
97. Continental Illinois Bancorp, Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 304 (1989).
98. Id.
1997]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
merger approval would be withheld where the acquiring institution
failed to establish a record indicating "a basic level of compliance on
which the commitments can be evaluated."99 The Continental order
could guide future decisions of the Fed in light of statistics compiled
by federal bank regulators indicating that nearly one out of every ten
financial institutions examined with respect to CRA compliance since
July 1, 1990, received a less-than-satisfactory CRA rating.' °
In addition to the Continental order, the Federal Reserve Board
blocked a proposed merger between First Interstate Bancsystem of
Montana, Inc., based in Billings, Montana, and Commerce Banc-
shares of Wyoming, Inc., based in Sheridan, Wyoming."' The denial
followed a protest by Native Action, a community group located on
the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation, alleging that a subsidiary
bank of First Interstate had failed to take steps to address and meet
the credit needs of the reservation community. The Fed agreed with
the Native Action's allegations, recognizing that First Interstate had
little contact with the reservation." The Board also noted two "less-
than-satisfactory" CRA ratings by the FDIC.' The Board indicated
that while the bank had made some Small Business Administration
and other loans in its community, it had made only a limited number
of loans to members of the reservation and had taken action to im-
prove its CRA performance only after the merger application had
been filed.' As in Continental, no competitive issues were raised
and the denial of merger approval was based solely on community
reinvestment grounds.
At this point in the evolution of community reinvestment, the
Continental and First Interstate orders still represent isolated cir-
cumstances in which bank merger or acquisition applications were
denied solely on CRA grounds. 5 However, delays in the merger ap-
proval process resulting from community group CRA challenges
have already become more commonplace.' ° For example, the Char-
lotte Reinvestment Alliance's (the Alliance) effort to block NCNB
Corp.'s (now NationsBank) acquisition of two Tampa-area branches
99. Id. at 306.
100. See supra note 18.
101. Fed Blocks Attempted BHC Merger, Cites CRA Concerns by Cheyenne Group, 57
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, 1991, at 587,603.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Beyer, supra note 7, at 394 n.58.
106. See id. at 399-400.
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of Florida's American Savings & Loan resulted in extensive delays in
getting regulatory approval for the acquisition. The Alliance
claimed, based on a study of mortgage lending in minority areas in
Charlotte, that NCNB "had done very little in the way of community
reinvestment."'0 7 The Alliance, successful in negotiating $9 million in
CRA commitments from First Union Corp. as a result of a 1989
merger, was joined by community groups in Texas who filed com-
plaints alleging that NCNB failed to meet its CRA obligations in
minority areas in Austin, Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio.!0 " First
Union's application to acquire Florida National was also delayed on
CRA grounds. In commenting on its decision to approve First Un-
ion's bid, the Federal Reserve Board noted that "if not for the
deteriorating condition of Florida National ... it would not have ap-
proved ... [the] bid ... [in light of First Union's] past CRA
performance. '"'O Within days of the announcement that a merger
agreement had been reached between NCNB Corp. and C&S/Sovran
Corp., it was announced, apparently as part of an effort to stave off
CRA challenges, that $10 billion would be committed to community
development lending in existing NCNB and C&S/Sovran markets
over the next ten years."0 Shortly after the announcement, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board announced that it would conduct four public
hearings in connection with NCNB's application to acquire
C&S/Sovran."'
While post-Continental Board orders suggest that CRA is not
the beginning of the end of the convenience and needs inquiry,"2
Continental and First Interstate do indicate that a basic level of com-
pliance could, as a matter of course, be a necessary condition for the
approval of a merger or branching request."' An established record
of CRA compliance would, most certainly, provide a more objective
basis for determining whether a merger or acquisition is likely to
have the probable effect of meeting the convenience and needs of the
107. Community Groups Protest NCNB's Record Under CRA in Florida, Texas, 55
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 15, 1990, at 605, 613.
108. See id.
109. Fed OKs First Union Acquisition, Sets Tough CRA Compliance Conditions, 54
Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 1, 1990, at 1, 10.
110. See Martha Brannigan, NCNB, C&S Sovran Plan to Expand Lending for Com-
munity Development, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1991, at A5.
111. See Fed to Hold Public Hearings in Four Cities in NCNB-C&S Sovran Merger
Plan, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 12, 1991, at 441,448.
112. See First Union Corporation, 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 83,87 (1989).
113. Richard Ringer, Memphis Thrift Denied Branch on CRA Grounds, AM. BANKER,
July 24, 1989, at 3.
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community than would a commitment for future action.
V. COMMUNrrY REINVESTMENT ACT: ITS NEGATIVE IMPACT
As the impact of the CRA continues to grow, commentators
have begun to look closely at the potentially negative effects of this
reality. Since its enactment in 1977, members of the banking industry
have criticized the CRA. Specifically, bankers have noted three ad-
verse effects of the CRA on the banking industry: (1) the Act creates
a competitive disadvantage; (2) the Act provides tools for political
activists; and (3) the Act introduces a deterrent to investment.
A. Competitive Disadvantage
Bankers suggest that the CRA discriminates on two levels. First,
the CRA subjects the banking industry to costs and burdens that are
not imposed on similarly situated lending institutions. Consequently,
the Act places depository institutions at a competitive disadvantage
compared with their nonbank competitors. Second, within the de-
pository institution industry, the CRA discriminates against
wholesale banks and other specialized institutions that are not well-
adapted to community investment lending.
The CRA imposes significant compliance costs on institutions,
especially smaller institutions."' It induces socially unproductive ex-
penditures on public relations and documentation that provide no
benefit for local communities."' Furthermore, its requirements are
vague and self-contradictory, and its enforcement often appears arbi-
trary. ' Nevertheless, depository institutions, unlike other similarly
situated institutions, must incur the costs necessary to satisfy the re-
quirements of the CRA.
B. A Tool for Activists
Just as bankers criticize the CRA because it allegedly creates a
competitive disadvantage, bankers criticize the Act as simply creating
a tool for political activists. Bankers contend that activists use the
114. See "Mindless" Regulations Attacked, AM. BANKER, July 6, 1992, at 7 (stating
that one small institution in rural Nebraska, with only $16 million in assets, reportedly was
subjected to a week-long CRA exam by six examiners).
115. See Barbara A. Rehm, ABA: Cost of Compliance Equals 59% of Bank Profits,
AM. BANKER, June 18, 1992, at 1, 12 (stating that a study compiled by the American
Bankers Association in 1992 concluded that the banking industry spent $10.7 billion com-
plying with government regulation in 1991, and that the single most costly regulation of
all was the CRA).
116. See id.
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CRA to accomplish goals that the act was not intended to serve, and
for which it was poorly designed."' The statute encourages banks to
engage in affirmative action in hiring and credit allocation,"8 and the
Act is administered to encourage charitable giving by depository in-
stitutions."9 Regardless of the social benefits of affirmative action or
charitable giving, the CRA was not designed to serve these goals.
Using the Act to further these goals represents a distortion of its
original purpose.
More specifically, the CRA has become a potent political tool in
the hands of activist political groups. Activists have used the statute
to magnify their political importance, to gain special favors for them-
selves and their leaders, to obtain funding for pet projects, or garner
direct logistical or financial support for their operations.'2 Essen-
tially, some political leaders use the threat of a CRA challenge for
self-serving purposes rather than to serve the purposes of the Act.
This reality should not call into question the motives of all activist
groups, the great majority of which are reputable and public-
spirited,' but it should suggest that activist groups, like the rest of
117. See Jim Salter, Protest planned for NationsBank merger, NEWS & OBSERVER,
Nov. 23, 1996, at 8D (describing the actions of a group, led by University City, Missouri
lawyer Eric Vickers, that protested the merger of NationsBank and Boatmen's Banc-
shares and that asked NationsBank officials to, among other things, agree to add two
African-Americans to NationsBank's board of directors); see also, Kenneth Cline,
NAACP to Push for Hiring of More Blacks, AM. BANKER, Dec. 10, 1990, at 1 (stating
that the NAACP threatened CRA challenges to institutions that did not hire more Afri-
can-American employees).
118. See Cline, supra note 117, at 1, 6 (explaining that civil rights groups will ask banks
to agree to hire more blacks as condition to the groups dropping their CRA protests).
119. See Teresa Carson, Wells Takes the Cultural Route, AM. BANKER, Jan. 13, 1992,
at 10 (stating that Wells Fargo donated a landmark Victorian house in downtown Sacra-
mento, valued at $1 million, to a group promoting Chicano art with the explicit purpose of
earning CRA points with the regulators).
120. See Joel B. Obermayer, First Citizens answers critics with initiative, NEWS &
OBSERVER, Oct. 16. 1996, at 7A (noting that First Citizens accused Community Rein-
vestment Association of North Carolina (CRANC) of trying to extort $750,000 for its own
benefit and that CRANC officials replied that they had only proposed that First Citizens
give $150,000 a year over five years to community groups and nonprofit organization in
North Carolina to hire counselors who would be able to help people apply for loans).
121. See Letter from Irvin Henderson, President, Community Reinvestment Associa-
tion of North Carolina, to Carla Holiman, Applications Analyst, Office of Thrift
Supervision Department of the Treasury (June 11, 1996). In the letter, Mr. Henderson
noted that:
In both of its last two evaluations of First Citizens' community reinvestment per-
formance in North Carolina, the FDIC cited the Bank for numerous violations of
the Fair Housing Act, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act. These violations were of a serious enough nature to prompt James
B. Hyler, Vice-Chairman of First Citizens, to send all Bank personnel a memo
19971
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society, respond to incentives in order to serve their own interests.
Bankers assert that rather than manipulating the CRA to serve
purposes for which it was not designed, activists should use alterna-
tive methods to accomplish their goals. For example, local
organizations could work at the grass roots level to raise capital and
extend credit to community members who are known to the organi-
zation and whose credit-worthiness can be monitored. However, the
CRA does not require subsidizing poor or disadvantaged citizens.
Consequently, that goal could more adequately be served by direct
subsidy programs rather than by treating depository institutions as
some form of public utility that can be assessed to serve general so-
cial needs.
C. A Deterrent to Investment
Commentators allege that the CRA "poorly furthers the pur-
poses for which it was designed."' It penalizes institutions that
actually serve low- income and moderate-income neighborhoods,
while rewarding those that do not. In other words, the Act drives
capital away from poor neighborhoods by imposing a tax on those
depository institutions reckless enough to do business in such com-
munities," discourages innovation in the provision of financial
services to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, and might im-
pair the market position of existing institutions that serve local
community needs.
The CRA has different effects on varying types of depository in-
stitutions. 4 These differing effects manifest themselves in a variety
of ways. First, the Act discriminates against depository institutions
serving poor neighborhoods. Because a bank's CRA rating is based
on its lending practices in the area contiguous to its offices, the CRA
imposes greater costs on banks in poor areas than those in wealthy
areas to the extent that it causes banks to lend funds locally.'" Banks
which stated that if changes were not made, "the matter could be turned over to
the Department of Justice, which could very well bring aspects of our business to
a halt."
Id. (quoting NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 29, 1995). But see Joel Obermayer, First Citizens
answers critics with initiative, NEWS & OBSERVER, Oct. 16, 1996, at 1A (noting that in
response to the Community Reinvestment Association of North Carolina (CRANC) at-
tempt to block First Citizens' $7 billion expansion into Georgia, the bank accused
CRANC of trying to extort $750,000 for it own benefit).
122. Macey & Miller, supra note 9, at 296.
123. See Ray G. Huffaker, Market-Based Policies to Increase Home Mortgage Credit in
Declining Urban Neighborhoods, 106 BANKING L.J. 538,541-46 (1989).
124. See id.
125. This analysis assumes that it costs more to make loans in poor areas than in
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located in wealthy areas can elect not to make loans in poor areas
outside their immediate communities without risking serious CRA
challenges. Banks located in poor areas, on the other hand, are re-
quired by the CRA to devote a substantial proportion of their loan
portfolios to their local communities. 6 Because of these additional
regulatory requirements and costs, banks seeking to expand may be
less likely to establish new branches or offices in poor areas than they
were prior to the promulgation of the CRA.
Additionally, some institutions might close offices in certain
neighborhoods because they could be publicly criticized for not
meeting the credit needs of such neighborhoods when they attempt
to acquire a branch in another location.'27 This closure of offices
would increase the present concentration of financial institution of-
fices in more affluent neighborhoods.'"
Ultimately, as the role of the CRA continues to expand, bankers
will continue to criticize the Act's negative effects. This open criti-
cism should draw attention to concerns about the competitive
disadvantages the Act imposes on the banking industry, the potent
tool the Act has become in the hands of political activists, and the
deterrent to investment created by the Act. As legislators receive
information about these adverse effects of the Act, future legislation
may address these problems. '29
VII. CONCLUSION
The evolution of the Community Reinvestment Act from a pro-
hibition on redlining to an affirmative local credit obligation required
to win approval of mergers and acquisitions has drawn considerable
wealthy areas.
126. See 12 U.S.C §§ 2901(a)(1), (3). The CRA begins with the recitation that
"regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrite that their deposit
facilities serve the 'convenience and needs' of the communities in which they are char-
tered to do business," and that "regulated financial institutions have [a) continuing and
affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities in which
they are chartered." Id.
127. See Letter from Robert E. Barnett, Chairman, FDIC, to Senator William Prox-
mire (May 4, 1977). Mr. Barnett wrote that the CRA would have the effect of reducing
the availability of credit in impoverished areas was well understood at the time the statute
was enacted. Mr. Barnett, then Chairman of the FDIC, objected to the legislation on
exactly those grounds at that time. He argued persuasively that the practical effect of the
bill might be to discourage financial institutions from making applications for offices in
neighborhoods where funds are badly needed because of the reexamination that this
would entail with respect to their lending policies in service areas where they already had
offices. See id.
128. See id.
129. For a discussion of regulation Y, see supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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attention in the banking industry. Since its enactment in 1977, the
CRA has generated intense and often bitter controversy. While all
participants in the debate continually claim allegiance to the goals of
the Act, disagreement over the extent to which the Act should inter-
vene into the affairs of regulated institutions has stalled efforts to
revitalize and strengthen our communities.
A review of the legislative history of the CRA reveals significant
debate prior to its enactment. The community activists supported the
enactment of the CRA, which they hoped would increase lending in
low- and moderate-income communities. The banking industry, on
the other hand, was concerned that the CRA would unduly burden
the ability of banks to make sound business decisions. Ultimately,
through its evolution and subsequent revisions, the CRA addresses
the concerns of both community activists and the banking industry by
emphasizing reinvestment and less burdensome regulatory require-
ments. The revised Act provides financial institutions with more
objective criteria to assess their CRA performance."3' Further, the
proposed amendment to the CRA should streamline the merger ap-
plication process, resulting in increased banking activity in low- and
moderate-income areas.
Community groups will also benefit from the revised Act. By
encouraging public input, the agencies have acknowledged the impor-
tance of local community groups in the CRA process."' Banks,
instead of seeing community groups as their opponents in a merger or
acquisition, will be more apt to solicit information from community
activist groups to lessen their compliance costs. In addition, because
community groups make it a practice to be more informed about the
credit needs of their specific community, banks have added incentive
to work closely with community groups in order to reduce their re-
search costs3' as banks seek to satisfy the "convenience and needs"
requirements of antitrust statutes and the CRA.
With a new wave of bank and thrift mergers and acquisitions on
130. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156. Because the
CRA does not mandate credit allocation, there must be room for some agency discretion.
However, the new regulations balance this need with the need for more objectivity in the
examination process. See id.
131. See i&L
132. See Claudia Cummins, Texas Commerce Puts Teamwork Into CRA, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 9, 1993, at 18 ("[Bankers] need to access the expertise that already exists
in community lending, redevelopment, and affordable housing, and find partners that
know how to get the dollars into the community." (statement of Marc Shapiro, President
and Chief Executive Officer of Texas Commerce Bancshares) (internal quotation marks
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the horizon, the role of the Community Reinvestment Act will con-
tinue to increase. As the CRA assumes a more prominent position in
the merger and acquisition approval analysis, the CRA will
strengthen the antitrust considerations in this approval process. In
fact, if current trends continue, the CRA may become the sole stan-
dard for determining whether an acquiring institution has a
"convenience and needs" defense to an otherwise prohibited merger.
Perhaps more importantly, however, as the level of community in-
volvement in banking decisions continues to increase, a CRA record
could become the sole basis for decisions with respect to branching
and merger and acquisitions requests.
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